Seminars

Andrea Polo - UPF and Barcelona GSE

December 6, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

Hedger of Last Resort: Evidence from Brazil on FX Interventions, Local Credit and Global Financial Cycles (with Rodrigo Barbone Gonzalez, Dmitry Khametshin and José-Luis Peydró)

Abstract:
We analyze whether changes in global financial conditions affect local credit and the real economy in emerging markets and whether local central banks can attenuate such spillovers. For identification, we exploit macro shocks and three matched administrative registers in Brazil: a register of foreign credit flows to Brazilian commercial banks, a credit register from the Central Bank of Brazil, and a matched employer-employee dataset from the Ministry of Labor and Employment. We show that after the announcement of US Quantitative Easing tapering by Ben Bernanke in May 2013, which was associated with massive depreciation and increased volatility of the local currency, domestic commercial banks with larger foreign liabilities reduced the supply of credit to firms and this had real effects in terms of formal employment. However, these negative effects were attenuated in the following months when the Central Bank of Brazil announced a massive intervention program in the FX derivatives market to provide insurance against exchange rate risks (hedger of last resort). On top of these two subsequent shocks, we also analyze a full panel dataset from 2008 to 2015 and identify a broader channel: banks with larger FX liabilities reduce their supply of credit after episodes of US Dollar appreciation. Moreover, these effects are partially mitigated in the two years after the intervention of the central bank confirming that the policy of hedger of last resort has been effective in decreasing local economy exposure to global financial conditions.

Lunch Seminar: Chiara Lacava - Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”

November 10, 2017
1:00 pmto2:00 pm

Why Are Some Regions So Much More Productive than Others?

Abstract:
Differentials in aggregate labor productivity across regions could be due to differences (1) in workers’ skills (2) in firms’ technologies (3) in how efficiently skills and technologies are matched and (4) in institutional factors specific to each region. I introduce a framework to separately identify each determinant using matched employer-employee data. I estimate skills by comparing the wages of each worker with co-workers in the same firm and in the same region; technologies by comparing the productivity of firms with same workforce’s skills and in the same region. I estimate positive complementarities between skill and technology by measuring how workers and firms jointly contribute to productivity in the same region through a model of the aggregate production function. Finally, I disentangle region-specific factors from technologies since some firms have plants in more than one region. In an application to the Italian regions, I find that differences in firms’ technologies and in region-specific factors account respectively for 60% and 35% of the large productivity differentials. In contrast, no contribution is due to differences in the distribution of skills, since they are close to zero and do not change with the migration of workers. Also, under optimal assignment of workers productivity differences do not increase, but productivity level rises by around 20%.

Matteo Maggiori - Harvard University

December 18, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

International Currency and Capital Allocation

Itay Goldstein - Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

April 4, 2018
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

TBA

Lunch Seminar: Anastasia Litina - University of Luxembourg

October 11, 2017
1:00 pmto2:00 pm

Great Expectations: The Persistent Effect of Origin Institutions on Immigrants’ Political Trust

Abstract:
This research explores the forces behind the formation and the transmission of immigrants’ political trust and highlights the differences with respect to interpersonal trust. First, it theoretically and empirically establishes that immigrants coming from corrupt countries, tend to overtrust the institutions at the host country. This inflated trust of immigrants is documented as the Great Expectations effect. Second, the analysis explores whether political trust is shaped primarily by mean attitudes and/or by average institutional quality (both at the origin country). Interestingly, the findings establish that institutions have a stronger effect on shaping immigrants’ political trust than mean attitudes of their compatriots. Third, the implications of the Great Expectations effect are explored. The inflated trust of immigrants towards host institutions results in lower levels of political participation

Nir Jaimovich - University of Zurich

May 7, 2018
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

TBA

Francesco Franzoni - Università della Svizzera Italiana

March 22, 2018
5:00 pmto6:30 pm
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

TBA

Alexandre Max - Princeton University

March 15, 2018
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

TBA

Lunch Seminar: Juan Passadore - EIEF

October 25, 2017
1:00 pmto2:00 pm

Optimal Debt-Maturity Management (with Saki Bigio and Galo Nuño)

Abstract:
We solve the problem of a government that wants to smooth financial expenses by choosing over a continuum of bonds of different maturity. The planner takes into account that adjusting debt too fast can affect prices. At the same time, it wants to insure against several sources of risk: (a) income risk, (b) interest rate (price) risk, (c) liquidity risk (prices can become more sensitive to issuance’s), and (d) the risks in the cost of default. We characterize this infinite dimensional control problem to aid the design of the debt-maturity profile in response to these forms of risk.

Frédéric Malherbe - London Business School

November 3, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

A Positive Analysis of Bank Behaviour under Capital Requirements