Seminars

Lunch Seminar: Francesco D’Amuri - Banca d’Italia

October 11, 2017
1:00 pmto2:00 pm

Aging Workforce, Pension Reform, and Firm’s Dynamics (with Francesca Carta and Till von Wachter)

Abstract:
We exploit unique employer-employee data combined with balance sheet information covering 4000 Italian firms for the period 2005-2015 to analyze the short-run impact of a higher retirement age on: i) turnover and wages of workers of different age classes, ii) capital and iii) productivity levels. To obtain exogenous firm-level variation in the shares of elderly workers we exploit an unanticipated pension reform taking place in 2012 and restricting public pension eligibility criteria in different ways for workers belonging to different demographic groups. We find that the increase in the number of elderly workers has a positive impact on employment levels of workers of other age classes, confirming the presence of complementarities already found in studies carried out at more aggregate levels. Turning to wages, the increased supply of elderly workers implies a reduction in their daily pay, but has no impact on compensation for the rest of the workforce. Finally, an ageing workforce is associated in the short run to an increase in total capital and productivity levels, but a reduction in their per-worker amounts.

Salome Baslandze - EIEF

October 2, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

 Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics (with Ufuk Akcigit and Francesca Lotti )

Abstract:
Do political connections affect firm and industry dynamics? We study the Italian firms and their workers to answer this question. Our analysis uses a brand-new data spanning the period from 1993 to 2014 where we merge: (i) firm-level balance sheet data, (ii) universe of social security data on workers, (iii) patent data from the European Patent Office, (iv) registry of local politicians, and (v) detailed data on local elections in Italy. We find that firm-level political connections are widespread, especially among large firms, and that the industries with more politically connected firms feature worse firm dynamics. Market leaders are much more likely to hire a politician and less likely to innovate, compared to their competitors. In addition, connections relate to higher survival and growth in employment and sales but not in productivity. We build a firm dynamics model where we allow firms to invest in innovation and/or rent-seeking to advance their productivity and to overcome regulatory or bureaucratic burden. The model highlights an interaction between static gains and dynamic losses from rent-seeking for aggregate productivity.

Lunch Seminar: Alex Ludwig - Goethe-University

October 6, 2017
1:00 pmto2:00 pm

Precautionary Savings and Pecuniary Externalities: Analytical Results for Optimal Capital Income Taxation (with Dirk Krueger)

Massimo Motta - Universitá Pompeu Fabra

October 5, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

The Effect of Horizontal Mergers, When Firms Compete in Prices and Investments

Robert C. Johnson - Dartmouth College

October 19, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

Technology, Trade Costs, and the Pattern of Trade with Multistage Production

Yeon-Koo Che - Columbia University

October 30, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

TBA

Josep Pijoan-Mas - CEMFI

October 23, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

TBA

Christophe Perignon - HEC Paris

October 12, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

Pitfalls in Systemic-Risk Scoring

Raman Uppal - EDHEC Business School

October 16, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

Financial Innovation and Asset Prices

Julien Sauvagnat - Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi

October 26, 2017
5:00 pmto6:30 pm

Import Competition and Household Debt