BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT UID:1adbf746d7cbdc1acb4c8378b929647b CATEGORIES:Seminars CREATED:20180213T160723 SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Mark Armstrong - University of Oxford DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:
Competition with Captive Cus tomers (with John Vickers)
Abstract:
We analyse competition in set tings where customers vary in how many price offers they compare; some are ‘captive’ to just one supplier. Allowing firms to discriminate between cus tomer types (captive or not) is bad for consumers overall when firms are sy mmetric and consumers cannot affect how many offers they see, but may be go od otherwise. The effects of entry by a new firm depend on its pattern – i.e. which consumer segments the entrant serves. Entry within a no n-captive segment is bad for consumers, but entry is pro-consumer in the ca se of ‘independent reach’, for which we also examine merger effects. A dif ferent type of mixed strategy equilibrium appears in the case of ‘nested re ach’, with different firms competing in high and low price ranges. To expl ore how market outcomes depend on the pattern of competition, we solve the general three-firm case.
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