Associate Professor, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance
University of Chicago, Ph.D., 2009 University of Chicago, M.A., 2005 Bocconi University, BA, 2002
Industrial Organization, Market Design, Health Economics
“Comparing Procurement Auctions,” International Economic Review, forthcoming.
“Insurers’ Response to Selection Risk: Evidence from Medicare Enrollment Reforms”, (with A. Guglielmo), Journal of Health Economics, forthcoming.
“Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions,” (with T. Conley) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016, 8 (2): 1-32.
“Entry and Subcontracting in Public Procurement Auctions,” (with N. Branzoli) Management Science, December 2015, 61 (12): 2945–2962.
“Medicare Part D: Are Insurers Gaming the Low Income Subsidy Design?,” American Economic Review, April 2015, 105(4): 1547-80.
“Awarding Price, Contract Performance and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, January 2014, 6 (1): 108-132.
“The Welfare Effects of Supply Side Regulations in Medicare Part D” (with M. Polyakova and S. Ryan), R&R at the Journal of Political Economy
“Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions,” (with M. Goldmanis and A.Penta)
Honors, Awards and Fellowships
ERC Starting Grant 2016-2020
National Science Foundation 2013-2015
Phone:+39.06.4792.98012 Fax: +39.06.4792.4872 E-mail: francesco.decarolis [at] eief.it