

# Lecture 2: Beyond Matching

Costas Meghir

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# What is the key problem with Matching

- Individuals may be selected into treatment on the basis of unobserved characteristics.
- To see this consider the simple choice problem based on the Roy model

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i^0 &= \alpha' X_i + u_i^0 \\ Y_i^1 &= \beta' X_i + u_i^1 \\ T_i &= 1(Y_i^1 - Y_i^0 > 0) = 1(u_i^1 - u_i^0 > (\alpha - \beta)' X_i) \end{aligned}$$

- Here the selection into treatment is based on the gain and there is a trade-off between observed and unobserved characteristics in this determination
- Individuals with high values of  $u^0$  will tend not to be allocated to treatment, everything else being equal.
- Matching will not lead to consistent estimates.
- We now investigate alternatives

- Drop the  $X$ s for simplicity and use the regression representation:

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- What does this give?

# What does the IV estimator identify?

We can write

$$\beta^{IV} = \beta + \frac{E(Z_i v_i | T_i = 1) \Pr(T_i = 1 | Z_i)}{\text{cov}(T, Z)}$$

Thus for IV to be consistent for the average treatment effect we need the covariance between the return to treatment and the instrument to be zero *among the treated*. This will generally not be true.

Under an additional assumption Imbens and Angrist offer an alternative interpretation to Instrumental Variables: this is known as the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE)

# Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE: Imbens and Angrist, Econometrica 1994)

- Define the treatment allocation as a function of an instrument  $Z$  :  
 $T_i(Z)$
- The key additional assumption is that of *monotonicity*: Take two values of the instrument  $Z = a$  and  $Z = b$  such that  $a > b$  (or just think of the instrument as discrete). Then for each and every individual  $T(Z = a) \geq T(Z = b)$  (or for all  $i$   $T_i(Z = a) \leq T_i(Z = b)$ ).
- The exclusion and rank conditions are defined as follows: For any value of the instrument  $Z = a$   $\{Y_i^1, Y_i^0, T(Z = a)\}$  is independent of  $Z$ . Rank condition: The probability of being allocated to treatment  $P(T = 1|Z = a) = E(T|Z = a)$  is a *nontrivial* function of  $a$ .

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- Take first the difference in mean outcomes for the two values of the instrument, which we take to be 1, 0 :

$$\begin{aligned} E(Y|Z = 1) - E(Y|Z = 0) = \\ E [T(1)Y^1 + (1 - T(1))Y^0|Z = 1] \\ - E [T(0)Y^1 + (1 - T(0))Y^0|Z = 0] \end{aligned}$$

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- $E[Y^1 - Y^0 | T(1) - T(0) = 1] \Pr[T(1) - T(0) = 1]$

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- With Homogeneous treatment effects this does indeed become equal to the average treatment effect (=constant treatment effect)

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	T(0)		
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- Hence IV which is

$$[E(Y|Z = 1) - E(Y|Z = 0)] / [\Pr(T(1) = 1) - \Pr(T(0) = 1)]$$

is now equal to the average effect of the treatment for those induced into training by the instrument  $Z$ .

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  - ④ As an example consider two alternative policies that can increase participation in Higher education
    - ① Free tuition is randomly allocated to young people to attend College ( $Z_1 = 1$  means that the subsidy is available).
    - ② The possibility of a competitive scholarship is available for free tuition ( $Z_1 = 1$  means that the individual is allowed to compete for the scholarship)

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- First we need to assume that no one who intended to go to College will be discouraged from doing so as a result of the policy (*monotonicity*)
- This could fail as a result of a General Equilibrium response of the policy; for example if it is perceived that the returns to College decline as a result of the increased supply, those with better outside opportunities may drop out.

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- The subsidy is likely to draw poorer liquidity constrained students into College but not necessarily those with the highest returns.
- The scholarship is likely to draw in the best students, who may also have higher returns.
- It is not a priori possible to believe that the two policies will identify the same parameter, or that one experiment will allow us to learn about the returns for a broader/different group of individuals

Finally, we need to understand what monotonicity means in terms of restrictions on economic theory

- To quote from Vytlacil (2002) *Econometrica*:  
*“The LATE assumptions are not weaker than the assumptions of a latent index model, but instead impose the same restrictions on the counterfactual data as the classical selection model if one does not impose parametric functional form or distributional assumptions on the latter.”*

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- This is important because it shows that the LATE assumptions are equivalent to whatever economic modelling assumptions are required to justify the standard Heckman selection model and has no claim to greater generality.
- On the other hand there are no magical solutions to identifying effects when endogeneity/selection is present; this problem is exacerbated when the effects are heterogeneous and individuals select into treatment on the basis of the returns

# Further approaches to evaluation of programme effects

## Difference in Differences

- Sometimes we may feel we can impose more structure on the problem
- Suppose in particular that we can write the outcome equation as

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + d_t + \beta_i T_{it} + u_{it}$$

- In the above we have now introduced a time dimension  $t = \{1, 2\}$ .
- Now suppose that  $T_{i1} = 0$  for all  $i$  and  $T_{i2} = 1$  for a well defined group of individuals in our population. Denote the groups by  $G$ .

This framework allows us to identify the ATT effect under the assumption that the growth of the outcome in the non-treatment state is independent of treatment allocation:

$$E [Y_{i2}^0 - Y_{i1}^0 | T] = E [Y_{i2}^0 - Y_{i1}^0]$$

We have that

$$\begin{aligned} E[Y_{i2} - Y_{i1} | T_{i2} = 1] &= E[Y_{i2}^1 - Y_{i1}^1 | T_{i2} = 1] \\ &= d_2 - d_1 + E[\beta_i | T_{i2} = 1] \end{aligned}$$

- The above is the basis for the *before and after* estimator. However, this is not consistent because in general the time effects  $d_t$  differ with  $t$ . Thus if there is overall growth in the outcome variable this will be attributed to the treatment erroneously.

- Now consider:

$$E [Y_{i2}^0 - Y_{i1}^0 | T_{i2} = 1] = E [Y_{i2}^0 - Y_{i1}^0 | T_{i2} = 0]$$

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- We need an extra assumption: We can then obtain immediately an estimator for ATT as

$$E [\beta_i | T_{i2} = 1] = E [Y_{i2} - Y_{i1} | T_{i2} = 1] - E [Y_{i2} - Y_{i1} | T_{i2} = 0]$$

which can be estimated by the difference in the growth between the treatment and the control group.

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- Now the low earning group is low for two reasons
  - 1 They have low permanent earnings ( $a_i$  is low) - this is accounted for by diff in Diffs
  - 2 They have a negative transitory shock ( $u_{i1}$  is low) - this is *not* accounted for by diff in Diffs

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- This is effectively regression to the mean: those unlucky enough to have a bad shock recover and show greater growth relative to those with a good shock. The nature of the bias depends on the stochastic properties of the shocks and how individuals select into training.

- Ashefelter (1978) was one of the first to consider difference in differences to evaluate training programmes

TABLE 1.—MEAN EARNINGS PRIOR, DURING, AND SUBSEQUENT TO TRAINING FOR 1964 MDTA CLASSROOM TRAINEES AND A COMPARISON GROUP

	White Males		Black Males		White Females		Black Females	
	Comparison		Comparison		Comparison		Comparison	
	Trainees	Group	Trainees	Group	Trainees	Group	Trainees	Group
1959	\$1,443	\$2,588	\$ 904	\$1,438	\$ 635	\$ 987	\$ 384	\$ 616
1960	1,533	2,699	976	1,521	687	1,076	440	693
1961	1,572	2,782	1,017	1,573	719	1,163	471	737
1962	1,843	2,963	1,211	1,742	813	1,308	566	843
1963	1,810	3,108	1,182	1,896	748	1,433	531	937
1964	1,551	3,275	1,273	2,121	838	1,580	688	1,060
1965	2,923	3,458	2,327	2,338	1,747	1,698	1,441	1,198
1966	3,750	4,351	2,983	2,919	2,024	1,990	1,794	1,461
1967	3,964	4,430	3,048	3,097	2,244	2,144	1,977	1,678
1968	4,401	4,955	3,409	3,487	2,398	2,339	2,160	1,920
1969	\$4,717	\$5,033	\$3,714	\$3,681	\$2,646	\$2,444	\$2,457	\$2,133
Number of Observations	7,326	40,921	2,133	6,472	2,730	28,142	1,356	5,192

Ashenfelter (1978) reports the following results

TABLE 2.—CRUDE ESTIMATES (AND ESTIMATED STANDARD ERRORS), ASSUMING  $B=0$  AND  $\beta_j^1=0$  FOR  $j > 1$ , OF THE EFFECT OF TRAINING ON EARNINGS DURING AND AFTER TRAINING, WHITE MALE MDTA 1964 CLASSROOM TRAINEES

Effect in (value of $t$ )	Value of Effects for		
	$t-s=1963$	$t-s=1962$	$t-s=1961$
1962	—	—	91 (13)
1963	—	-179 (14)	-88 (17)
1964	-426 (16)	-605 (18)	-514 (20)
1965	763 (20)	584 (22)	675 (23)
1966	697 (25)	518 (27)	609 (28)
1967	833 (28)	655 (30)	746 (31)
1968	745 (34)	566 (35)	657 (36)
1969	984 (37)	805 (39)	896 (40)

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- This is just matching assumption on a redefined outcome variable, namely the growth in the outcomes. In its simplest form the approach is implemented by running the regression

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + d_t + \beta_i T_{it} + \gamma'_t X_i + u_{it}$$

which allows for differential trends in the non-treatment growth depending on  $X_i$ . More generally one can implement propensity score matching on the growth of outcome variable when panel data is available.

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- We need to modify slightly the assumption to

$$\begin{aligned} E [Y_{i2}^0 | \text{Group receiving training}] - E [Y_{i1}^0 | \text{Group to receive training in next period}] \\ = E [Y_{i2}^0 - Y_{i1}^0] \end{aligned}$$

which essentially requires, in addition to the original independence assumption that conditioned on particular individuals that population we will be sampling from does not change composition

# Difference in Differences with repeated cross sections

- Suppose we do not have available panel data but just a random sample from the relevant population in a pre-treatment a post-treatment period. We can still use difference in differences.

- First consider the simpler case where

$$E [Y_{i2}^0 - Y_{i1}^0 | T] = E [Y_{i2}^0 - Y_{i1}^0] .$$

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which essentially requires, in addition to the original independence assumption that conditioned on particular individuals that population we will be sampling from does not change composition

- We can then obtain immediately an estimator for ATT as

$$\begin{aligned} E [\beta_i | T_{i2} = 1] = \\ E [Y_{i2} | \text{Group receiving training}] - E [Y_{i1} | \text{Group to receive training in next period}] \\ - \{ E [Y_{i2} | \text{Non-trainees}] - E [Y_{i1} | \text{Group not to receive training in next period}] \} \end{aligned}$$

# Difference in Differences with repeated cross sections

- More generally we need an assumption of conditional independence of the form

$$\begin{aligned} E [Y_{i2}^0 | X, \text{Group receiving training}] - E [Y_{i1}^0 | X, \text{Group to receive training in next period}] \\ = E [Y_{i2}^0 | X] - E [Y_{i1}^0 | X] \end{aligned}$$

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- Under this assumption (and some auxiliary parametric assumptions) we can obtain an estimate of the effect of treatment on the treated by the regression

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_g + d_t + \beta T_{it} + \gamma' X_{it} + u_{it}$$

- More generally we can first run the regression

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_g + d_t + \beta(X_{it})T_{it} + \gamma'_t X_{it} + u_{it}$$

where  $\alpha_g$  is a dummy for the treatment of comparison group, and where  $\beta_i(X_{it})$  can be parameterised as  $\beta(X_{it}) = \beta'X_{it}$ . The ATT can then be estimated as the average of  $\beta'X_{it}$  over the (empirical) distribution of  $X$ .

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- A non parametric alternative is offered by Blundell, Dias, Meghir and van Reenen (2004)

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where  $Z$  is an instrument which determines training eligibility say but does not determine outcomes in the non-training state. Take  $Z$  as binary (1,0)

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- Non-Compliance: not all members of the eligible group ( $Z = 1$ ) will take up training and some of those ineligible ( $Z = 0$ ) may obtain training by other means.
- A difference in differences approach based on grouping by  $Z$  will estimate the impact of being allocated to the eligible group, but not the impact of training itself.

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- In this case LATE is defined by

$$[E(\Delta Y|Z = 1) - E(\Delta Y|Z = 0)] / [Pr(T(1) = 1) - Pr(T(0) = 1)]$$

assuming that the probability of training in the first period is zero