

Discussion of
Managing Credit Booms and Busts: A
Pigouvian Taxation Approach

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- This paper presents a theory of **fluctuations in consumption** due to **credit markets imperfections**.
- The authors emphasize the failure of consumers to internalize their savings decisions on asset prices as a source of the fluctuations. They argue in favor of a **“Pigouvian tax.”**
- They provide a quantitative assessment of the theory:
 - **$\tau \approx 0.5\%$** of outstanding debt.
- **I have enjoyed reading the paper very much!**

- In my discussion:
 - Illustrate the main ideas of the paper;
 - Propose a different interpretation;
 - In the light of this, discuss policy implications.

I. The main idea

•Key ingredients:

- Citizens are endowed with a **partially tradable asset**:
 - Only locals can own it. Its price is p_t .
 - It generates a stochastic flow of income y_t .
- Imperfect credit market require collateral $debt \leq \phi p_t$

•Two observations:

- We have a **feedback effect**:

$$c \downarrow \rightarrow p \downarrow \rightarrow debt \downarrow \rightarrow c \downarrow$$

Credit imperfections amplify fluctuations in c .

- Agents are **price-takers**. Agent i does not internalize that:

$$s^i_t \downarrow \rightarrow Ec^i_{t+1} \downarrow \rightarrow Ep_t \downarrow \rightarrow Ec^j_{t+1} \downarrow$$

- **The authors conclude:** we need a **Pigouvian tax** that forces the consumers internalize this “*externality*.”

II. Is the externality the problem?

- A **price externality** is present even in a standard unconstrained Pareto efficient competitive equilibrium.
- Here, price changes have a **first order effect** on welfare because **the allocation is inefficient** when the collateral constraint is binding.
- The planner smoothes the cost of the distortion by taxing in good times and subsidizing consumption in bad times.
- There is however **no need to tax private debt** (which may be very distortive both on consumption and on investment).

- A **lump sum** tax on income may be superior, and always be used:
 - It does not fix the “price externality”
 - By smoothing asset prices, it fixes the cause of the problem.
- Even when income taxation is distortionary, it is necessary in a constrained optimum.
- **Bottom line:** *we can not discuss welfare implications of the Pigouvian tax if we ignore the rest of fiscal policy. This is a problem of **public debt management**.*

III. The calibration

- The authors do a good job in exploring the **quantitative implications** of the model:
 - Without the explicit consideration of a **richer policy mix**, the argument for a “Pigouvian tax” is not persuasive.
 - **Partial equilibrium assumption** that $\beta R < 1$ is problematic.
- The theoretical model however is a good platform to study the issues that I have tried to highlight in this discussion.