Managing Credit Booms and Busts A Pigouvian Taxation Approach

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Conference on the Future of Monetary Policy

Rome, October 1st, 2010

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Key Question

How should policymakers respond to booms and busts in credit markets and asset markets?


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Key Assumptions

Financial markets are imperfect:

- borrowing is subject to constraints
- constraints depend on asset prices
- potential for feedback spirals between
 - collapsing asset prices
 - tightening borrowing constraints ٠
 - declining spending
 - \rightarrow financial accelerator, debt deflation, ...

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


Jeanne and Korinek (2010)

Managing Credit Booms and Busts

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Key Results

- endogenous borrowing constraints amplify volatility
- Ø decentralized equilibrium is socially suboptimal:
 - excessive debt
 - excessive exposure to binding constraints
 - excessive volatility (systemic risk)
- strong case for macroprudential regulation

- Financial accelerator effects: Fisher (1933), Kiyotaki-Moore (1997), Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist (1999), etc.
- Deleveraging externalities: Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek (2009)
- Optimal policy in DSGE models with financial accelerator: Bianchi (2010), Benigno et al. (2010), Bianchi-Mendoza (2010)
- Empirical importance of amplification: Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), Adrian and Shin (2009ab), etc.

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DSGE Setup in infinite discrete time

Two sets of agents:

Insiders who exclusively own an asset (tree), representing e.g.

- entrepreneurs: more productive at operating an asset
- households: put higher utility on owning their home
- locals in small open economy: value local assets more
- speculators: more risk-tolerant towards an asset
- agents with informational advantage
- Outsiders: large in comparison, provide credit at rate R

Debt is the only financial contract

Insiders

Optimization problem of representative insider:

- Hold $a_t = 1$ unit of tree
- Obtain endowment income $(1 \alpha)y_t$ and income from tree αy_t every period
- Trade trees, but solely among insiders
- Hold financial wealth wt with outsiders
- Maximize utility

$$U_t = E_t \left(\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(c_s) \right) \quad \text{where } u(c_s) = \frac{c_s^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

s.t. $c_t + a_{t+1}p_t + \frac{w_{t+1}}{R} = (1-\alpha)y_t + a_t(p_t + \alpha y_t) + w_t$

and subject to a moral hazard problem that limits borrowing to

$$\frac{w_{t+1}}{R} \ge -\phi p_t - \psi$$

Equilibrium

- State of economy: summarized by (w, y)
- Dynamics captured by 3 equilibrium functions: c(w, y), p(w, y) and $\lambda(w, y)$
- Equilibrium conditions:

$$c(w, y) = \min \left\{ w + e + y + \phi p(w, y), \left[\beta RE \left(c(w', y')^{-\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1/\gamma} \right\}$$

$$p(w, y) = \frac{\beta E \left[u'(c(w', y'))(y' + p(w', y')) + \phi \lambda(w', y')p(w', y') \right]}{u'(c(w, y))}$$

$$\lambda(w, y) = c(w, y)^{-\gamma} - \beta RE \left(c(w', y')^{-\gamma} \right)$$

• Transition equation for wealth:

$$w'/R = w + y - c(w, y)$$

• Define grids y^g, d^g for output shock and net worth

Solution through reverse time iteration:

- in step k, start with functions $c_k(w, y)$, $p_k(w, y)$ and $\lambda_k(w, y)$
- for any (w', y) derive unconstrained t 1 solution
- for any (w' > 0, y) derive constrained t 1 solution
- for any y, determine threshold $\bar{w}(y)$ for binding constraints
- concatenate constrained/unconstrained functions
- interpolate $c_{k+1}(w, y)$, $p_{k+1}(w, y)$ and $\lambda_{k+1}(w, y)$
- ightarrow endogenous gridpoints bifurcation method

Unconstrained equilibrium (for sufficiently high net worth and output) Given policy functions $c_k(w, y)$, $p_k(w, y)$, $\lambda_k(w, y)$ for next period,

• consumption $c^{unc}(w', y) = \left[\beta RE\left(c'^{-\gamma}\right)\right]^{-1/\gamma}$

• net worth
$$w^{unc}(w', y) = c^{unc} - y + \frac{w'}{R}$$

• asset price
$$p^{unc}(w', y) = \beta E \left[\frac{u'(c')}{u'(c^{unc})} \cdot (\alpha y' + p') \right]$$

• threshold level of net worth is $w \ge \bar{w} = -\phi p^{unc} - \psi$

Constrained equilibrium (for low net worth, low output shock) Given policy functions $c_k(w, y)$, $p_k(w, y)$, $\lambda_k(w, y)$ for next period,

- asset price $p^{con}(w', y) = -\frac{1}{\phi} \left[\frac{w'}{R} + \psi \right]$ from binding constraint
- consistent with a level of consumption of $c^{con}(w', y) = \left[\frac{\beta E\{u'(c') \cdot (\alpha y' + p^{con}) + \phi \lambda' p' | y\}}{p^{con}}\right]^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}$
- net worth $w^{con}(w', y) = c^{con} y \phi p^{con} \psi$
- shadow price $\lambda^{con}(w', y) = u'(c^{con}) \beta RE[u'(c')]$
- ⇒ combine constrained/unconstrained policy functions ⇒ interpolate next iteration $c_{k+1}(w, y), p_{k+1}(w, y), \lambda_{k+1}(w, y)$

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


Figure: Equilibrium equation: $c \le w + y + \phi p(c) + \psi$

Policy Functions




Figure: Equilibrium policy functions

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Introduce a constrained social planner who

- is subject to the same borrowing limits as insiders
- coordinates (regulates) borrowing choices in the economy
- internalizes effect of choices on asset prices
- optimizes every period (no commitment)

Social planner's optimality condition:

$$u'(c_t) = \lambda_t + \beta RE_t \left[u'(c_{t+1}) + \phi \lambda_{t+1} \frac{\partial p_{t+1}}{\partial w_{t+1}} \right]$$

Interpretation of externality term $\phi \lambda_{t+1} \frac{\partial p_{t+1}}{\partial w_{t+1}}$:

- $\frac{\partial p_{t+1}}{\partial w_{t+1}}$ captures asset price increase resulting from higher wealth
- ϕ reflects resulting relaxation in borrowing constraint
- $\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{E_t[u'(c_{t+1})]}$ represents utility cost of constraint

externality active if borrowing constraint is binding in the future

Social planner solution:

- planner takes on less debt in periods before constraint is binding (systemic precautionary savings)
- less debt, less severe future constraints
- less volatility and financial fragility
- \rightarrow social planner reduces debt and uncertainty

.

Implementation of Constrained Social Optimum

Implementation through Pigouvian taxation:

- Introduce tax $\tau_t = \tau(w_t, y_t)$ on borrowing $-w_{t+1}/R$
- Rebate lump sum $T_t = -\tau_t \cdot w_{t+1}/R$

$$\max U_t = E_t \left(\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(c_s) \right)$$

s.t. $c_t + (1 - \tau_t) \frac{w_{t+1}}{R} = y_t + w_t + T_t$
 $\frac{w_{t+1}}{R} \ge -\phi p_t - \psi$

To implement constrained optimum, tax must satisfy

$$\tau\left(\boldsymbol{w}_{t},\boldsymbol{y}_{t}\right) = \frac{\phi\beta RE_{t}\left[\lambda_{t+1}\frac{\partial p_{t+1}}{\partial \boldsymbol{w}_{t+1}}\right]}{u'(c_{t})}$$

Alternative mechanisms to implement Pigouvian tax:

- Direct taxation of debt (note: opposite of interest deductability on debt!)
- Prudential regulation: uses existing frameworks
- Limits on leverage / margin requirements
- Risk management systems

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Calibration

Assumptions:

- capture booms and busts with binomial distribution for output $y_t \in \{y^L, y^H\}$ with probabilities π and (1π) (we set $\pi = 5\%$)
- calibrate parameters to match observed sectoral bust in 2008/09
- βR < 1 so insiders have a persistent motive for borrowing (we set β = 0.96, R = 1.025, γ = 2)

Table: Balance sheet data for US Households, SMEs and Corporations

	Assets			Debt		
	2008q2	2009q2	Chg.	2008q2	2009q2	Chg.
Households	74,273	64,425	-13.3%	14,418	14,116	-2.1%
SMEs	11,865	10,409	-12.3%	5,410	5,343	-1.2%
Corporations	28,579	26,521	-7.2%	13,039	13,597	+4.3%

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Table: Sectoral Parameter Values

	α	ϕ	ψ	УL
US Households	24.5%	3.1%	307%	0.963
US SMEs	20.0%	4.6%	197%	0.969

- Corporate sector: no credit crunch detected (corporate debt substituted for bank credit)
- Financial sector: parameter *φ* is in multiple equilibrium region
 → dynamics cannot be captured by our model

Model dynamics:

- Boom steady state w_H^{SS} : determined by trade-off of
 - impatience ($\beta R < 1$) versus
 - precautionary savings (smooth c in case of bust)
- During booms, insiders accumulate debt up to w_H^{SS} \rightarrow create vulnerability to next bust
- During busts, binding constraints and debt deflation occurs

Wealth Dynamics




Figure: Next-period wealth function in states H and L

Decentralized Equilibrium Vs. Social Planner




Figure: Decentralized equilibrium vs. planner's solution

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Sample Paths of Macroeconomic Variables




Figure: Sample path of planner's *y*, *c*, *w*', *p* and τ

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Table: Optimal magntiude of Pigouvian tax by sector

	п			Δp^{DE}	'
US Households	0.48%	-6.80%	-5.99%	-13.33%	-11.75%
US SMEs	0.56%	-6.22%	-5.21%	-12.27%	-10.29%

Note: if impatience motive strong, planner chooses constrained w_H^{SS} \rightarrow debt levels determined by constraint, not τ_H^{SS} (cp. Greenspan doctrine)

Effects of liberalization that increases borrowing capacity:

After financial liberalization, insiders experience

- first a debt-financed consumption boom (honeymoon of liberalization)
- then lower and more volatile consumption (binding constraints amplify effects of output shocks)

Interest Rates and Financial Fragility




Figure: Dependence of externality τ_H^{SS} on interest rate

Financial Development and Fragility




Figure: Dependence of externality τ_H^{SS} on pledgeability ϕ

Risk of Busts and Financial Fragility




Figure: Dependence of externality τ_H^{SS} on crisis risk π

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Adaption of Framework to Financial Shocks:

- we model busts as declines in ψ rather than y
- calibrating policy measure τ_H^{SS} yields almost identical results

Inclusion of Bailout Funds:

- assume policymakers tax insiders during booms and accumulate a bailout fund
- in bad times the fund is used to make a transfer to insiders
- $\rightarrow\,$ bailout will be precisely offset by increased risk-taking, unless tax in booms is large enough to make insiders constrained

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Assume insiders can sell an equity stake $s \leq \bar{s}$:

- outsiders immediately buy maximum possible \bar{s} at price $\tilde{p} = \frac{E(y)}{B-1}$
- insiders experience a temporary consumption boom
- in the long run, equilibrium is almost unchanged (aside from parameter ψ, model is homogenous of degree 1)
- \rightarrow optimal macroprudential tax unaffected by equity investments

Trade-off financial stability vs. growth:

- assume insiders need to invest *x* to obtain growth *g*(*x*), where *g*(·) is concave
- binding constraints make investment more expensive
- in decentralized equilibrium, severe busts curtail growth
- $\rightarrow\,$ optimal macro-prudential regulation increases stability and growth

- Endogenous financial constraints generate financial amplification
- In such an economy, decentralized agents borrow excessively
 → exacerbate boom-busts cycles in credit and asset prices
- Social planner can improve welfare by leaning against the wind through appropriate macro-prudential regulation

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