Seminars 2012

Lunch Seminar: Jean-Paul L’Huillier - EIEF

January 19, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

News, Noise and Fluctuations: an Empirical Investigation

Abstract:

I will present some new results for our paper. Old abstract: We explore empirically models of aggregate fluctuations with two basic ingredients: agents form anticipations about the future based on noisy sources of information; these anticipations affect spending and output in the short run. Our objective is to separate fluctuations due to actual changes in fundamentals (news) from those due to temporary errors in the private sector’s estimates of these fundamentals (noise). Using a simple model where the consumption random walk hypothesis holds exactly, we address some basic methodological issues and take a first pass at the data. First, we show that if the econometrician has no informational advantage over the agents in the model, structural VARs cannot be used to identify news and noise shocks. Next, we develop a structural Maximum Likelihood approach which allows us to identify the model’s parameters and to evaluate the role of news and noise shocks. Applied to postwar U.S. data, this approach suggests that noise shocks play an important role in short-run fluctuations.

Stefano Rossi - Imperial College London

January 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks and Financial Institutions

Abstract

We build a model where sovereign defaults weaken banks’ balance sheets because banks hold sovereign bonds, causing private credit to decline. Stronger financial institutions boost default costs by amplifying these balance-sheet effects. This yields a novel complementarity between public debt and domestic credit markets, where the latter sustain the former by increasing the costs of default. Confirming our model’s predictions, we document three novel empirical facts: public defaults are followed by large private credit contractions; these contractions are stronger in countries where banks hold more public debt and financial institutions are stronger; in these same countries default is less likely.

Vincent Pohl - Yale University (Job Market Seminar)

January 23, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Medicaid and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers: Implications for Health Care Reform

Manasa Patnam - University of Cambridge (Job Market Seminar)

January 24, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Corporate Networks and Peer Effects in Firm Policies

Joaquin Blaum - MIT (Job Market Seminar)

January 27, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Wealth Inequality and the Losses from Financial Frictions

Rui Silva - University of Chicago (Job Market Seminar)

January 30, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

The Real Cost of Conglomerates

Lunch Seminar: Marco Lippi - University of Rome “La Sapienza” & EIEF

January 31, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

One Sided Representations of Generalized Dynamic Factor Models: Solving the Non-fundamentalness Problem

Bruno Ferman - MIT (Job Market Seminar)

February 3, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Reading the Fine Print: Credit Demand and Information Disclosure in Brazil

Margarida Soares - University of Chicago (Job Market Seminar)

February 4, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:00 pm

Firm Boundaries and the Power of Incentives: Evidence from Mutual Funds

Camille Landais - Stanford University (Job Market Seminar)

February 9, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Heterogeneity and Behavioral Responses to Unemployment Benefits over the Business Cycle

Larry Epstein - Boston University

February 13, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Bayesian Inference and Non-Bayesian Prediction and Choice; Foundations and an Application to Entry Games with Multiple Equilibria

Mu-Jeung Yang - U.C. Berkeley (Job Market Seminar)

February 20, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Micro-level Misallocation and Selection: Estimation and Aggregate Implications

Luigi Iovino - MIT (Job Market Seminar)

February 24, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Sophisticated Intermediation and Aggregate Volatility

Xiaodong Fan - University of Wisconsin-Madison (Job Market Seminar)

February 27, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Retiring Cold Turkey

Peter Cziraki - Tilburg University (Job Market Seminar)

February 29, 2012
from 4:30 pm to 6:00 pm

Trading by Bank Insiders before and during the Financial Crisis

Sudipto Bhattacharya - London School of Economics and CEPR

March 5, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Securitized Banking, Asymmetric Information, and Financial Crisis: Regulating Systemic Risk Away

Marco Ottaviani - Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

March 12, 2012
from 4:00 pm to 5:30 pm

Separate or Joint Financing? Coinsurance, Risk Contamination, and Optimal Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs

Lunch Seminar: Julia Thomas - The Ohio State University and NBER

March 13, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Credit Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an Economy with Production Heterogeneity

LABOUR Lecture: Charles F. Manski - Northwestern University

March 20, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm

Public Policy in an Uncertain World: Analysis and Decisions

Edward Prescott - Arizona State University

March 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

The Labor Productivity Puzzle

Workshop on “European Sovereign Debt: Two Proposals”

March 21, 2012
from 10:00 am to 1:00 pm

For further details, please see the Program.

Please note that participation is free but registration is required due to space constraints.

LABOUR Lecture: Charles F. Manski - Northwestern University

March 22, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm

Public Policy in an Uncertain World: Analysis and Decisions

Christopher Taber - University of Wisconsin-Madison

March 22, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Estimation of a Roy/Search/Compensating Differential Model of the Labor Market

Cyril Monnet - Universität Bern

March 26, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Why Rent When You Can Buy? A Theory of Repurchase Agreements

Claudio Michelacci - CEMFI

March 29, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Optimal Life Cycle Unemployment Insurance

Lunch Seminar: Tommaso Nannicini - Bocconi University

April 2, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign

Scott Fulford - Boston College

April 2, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

If financial development matters, then how? National banks in the United States 1870–1900

Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University

April 3, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Topics in Asset Pricing

Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University

April 4, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Topics in Asset Pricing

Michelle Sovinsky - University of Zurich

April 5, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Marijuana on Main Street: What if?

Lunch Seminar: Rodrigo Caputo - Bank of Chile

April 10, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Monetary Policy Rules for a Two-Speed World Economy

2nd Workshop on Structural Approaches to Productivity and Industrial Dynamics

April 12, 2012
from 12:00 pm to 6:30 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events

2nd Workshop on Structural Approaches to Productivity and Industrial Dynamics

April 13, 2012
from 8:30 am to 6:00 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events

Lunch Seminar: Joacim Tåg - Research Institute of Industrial Economics

April 16, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Private Equity and Employees

Juan Sanchez - St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank

April 16, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Why Doesn’t Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?

Lunch Seminar: Sergei Kovbasyuk - EIEF

April 19, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Optimal Certification Design

Abstract:

A public rating of a product is issued by a certifier who internalizes the buyers’ surplus and receives payments from a seller. A rating scheme compatible with Bayesian updating by buyers is characterized when the payment to the certifier is 1) fixed, 2) contingent on the rating and publicly known, 3) contingent on the rating and privately known to the seller and the certifier. A feasible rating scheme under contingent private payment implies coarse ratings and pooling on the top property: high ratings are issued for a wide range of qualities.
If the seller were to choose the rating scheme, then under a contingent public payment she would induce pooling up to some quality threshold and perfect revelation afterwards. Under a private contingent payment or a fixed payment she would induce complete pooling. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a regulation that prohibits public contingent payments may harm information revelation and social welfare. A desirable regulation calls for transparent payments between the seller and the certifier.

David Dorn - CEMFI

April 19, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level Evidence

Abstract:

In the past two decades, China’s manufacturing exports have grown spectacularly. U.S. imports from China have surged, while U.S. exports to China have increased more modestly, consistent with the two countries’ divergent current account imbalances. Using data on individual earnings by employer from the Social Security Administration, we examine how workers in manufacturing industries exposed to import competition from China have fared in terms of labor income, employment, job mobility, and receipt of Social Security benefits. Over the period 1992 to 2007, workers who in 1991 were employed in industries that experienced high subsequent levels of import growth have more years with zero labor earnings, lower cumulative earnings over the period, and a greater likelihood of receiving Social Security Disability Insurance as the only recorded source of income in a given year. More exposed individuals spend less time working for their initial employers, less time working in their initial two-digit manufacturing industries, and more time working elsewhere in manufacturing. Effects on earnings and employment are much larger for women than for men, and also larger for individuals whose initial employers were relatively large, whose initial wages where below their firm’s average, and who in the pre-sample period worked part time or intermittently. Individuals who work in regions more exposed to import growth (beyond their industry of employment) have more years with zero labor earnings as well. We obtain similar results using alternative measures of trade exposure. Our findings suggest that there is significant worker-level adjustment cost to import shocks and that adjustment is highly uneven across individuals according their conditions of employment in the pre-shock period.

Andrea Gamba - University of Warwick

April 23, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Capital Regulation, Liquidity Requirements and Taxation in a Dynamic Model of Banking

Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University

April 24, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

Topics in Asset Pricing

Richard Blundell - University College London

April 26, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

“Empirical Evidence and Tax Reform”

Abstract:

This paper examines the role of evidence in drawing up the recommendations for tax reform in the Mirrlees Review. The arguments are organised loosely under five related headings: (i) Key margins of adjustment, (ii) Measurement of effective tax rates, (iii) The importance of information and complexity, (iv) Evidence on the size of responses, and (v) Implications from theory for tax design. Although the Mirrlees Review focusses on all aspects of tax reform, the focus is this paper is on the taxation of earnings with some examples drawn from the taxation of consumption and savings.

Conference on “Economics of Interactions and Culture”

April 27, 2012
from 9:00 am to 7:00 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events

Conference on “Economics of Interactions and Culture”

April 28, 2012
from 9:00 am to 7:00 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events

Joel Peress - INSEAD

April 30, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

The Media and the Diffusion of Information in Financial Markets: Evidence from Newspaper Strikes

Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University

May 2, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Topics in Asset Pricing

Lunch Seminar: Karl Walentin - Sveriges Riksbank

May 3, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Stylized (Arte)Facts on Sectoral Inflation

Liran Einav - Stanford University

May 3, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Moral hazard in health insurance: How important is forward looking behavior?

Lunch Seminar: Valentino Dardanoni - University of Palermo

May 4, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

The Welfare Cost of Unpriced Heterogeneity in Insurance Markets

Abstract:

We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs.
We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss.
After identifying some ‘deep types’ which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we use these deep types to derive the demand and cost functions for each unobservable type, quantifying the efficiency costs of unpriced heterogeneity.
We apply our methods to the US Long-Term Care and Medigap insurance markets, where we find that unpriced heterogeneity causes substantial inefficiency.

Special Lecture: Larry Epstein - Boston University

May 4, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm

Topics in Asset Pricing

Andreas Stathopoulos - USC Marshall School of Business

May 7, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Portfolio Home Bias and External Habit Formation

Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University

May 8, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

Topics in Asset Pricing

Lunch Seminar: Robert Chirinko (University of Illinois - Chicago)

May 9, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Job Creation Tax Credits and Job Growth: Evidence from the U.S. States

Abstract:

An unemployment rate remaining unacceptably high and monthly job gains barely keeping pace with labor force growth have generated discussions about innovative fiscal policy instruments, such as job creation tax credits (JCTCs), to help stimulate labor demand. This paper studies the effects of JCTCs enacted by U.S. states over the past 20 years. Twenty-three states have adopted JCTCs, and their experiences provide a rich source of information for assessing the effectiveness of such policies. We investigate whether JCTCs affect employment growth before, at, and after the time they go into effect. These questions are investigated in an event study framework applied to monthly panel data on employment, the JCTC effective and legislative dates, and various controls. We find that the JCTC elasticity of employment is 0.35. This estimate suggests that President Obama’s recently proposed JCTC would create 280,000 more jobs and would lower the unemployment rate by 0.1 percentage points.

Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University

May 10, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

Topics in Asset Pricing

Lunch Seminar: Emanuela Cardia - Université de Montréal

May 10, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

The Household Revolution: Childcare, Housework, and Female Labor Force Participation

Roberto Pancrazi - Toulouse School of Economics

May 10, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Effects of Banks and Households’ Optimism on Collateralized Debt: The Case of Home Equity Extraction

Abstract:

The last two decades have been characterized by a boom in the credit market for collateralized debt, namely mortgages and home equity loans, which led to a severe financial crisis. In this paper, we first document that players on both sides of the credit market, i.e. banks and households, were over-optimistic about future housing prices. We propose a parsimonious statistical approach to model biased expectations, aimed to capture information incompleteness about the data generating process. We then propose a more general model of a collateralized credit market, where households choose how much to borrow and whether to repay their debt, and banks decide the quantity of credit supplied, taking into account default possibilities. We show that over-optimistic expectations lead to severe distortions on the credit market, resulting in a large quantity of debt issued at a low price. We finally investigate the role of different policies in eliminating these distortions.

Miklos Koren - Central European University

May 14, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Technology Transfer through Capital Imports: Firm-level Evidence

Abstract:

What is the effect of imported technology on firm productivity? To study this question, we develop a dynamic model of firm investment and importing decisions and estimate it in Hungarian firm-level panel data. Our preliminary results indicate that (i) The share of imported capital is strongly positively related to productivity; (ii) Imports from R&D abundant countries matter more for productivity than imports from low-R&D countries; (ii) Imported capital and imported material inputs are complementary, which strengthens the productivity effect.

Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University

May 15, 2012
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm

Topics in Asset Pricing

Lunch Seminar: Danila Serra - Florida State University

May 16, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Participatory Accountability and Collective Action

Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University

May 17, 2012
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm

Topics in Asset Pricing

Neale Mahoney - Harvard University

May 17, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End Spending? Evidence from Federal Procurement

Lunch Seminar: Jean-Paul L’Huillier - EIEF

May 18, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Technological Revolutions and Debt Hangovers: Is There a Causal Link?

Abstract:
Three major private debt caused recessions in developed economies — the Great Recession, the Japanese crisis of the 90s, and the Great Depression — have been preceded by periods of great technological innovation and economic transformation. Motivated by this fact, we write a business cycle model featuring imperfect information. We estimate this model using time series data for the three episodes. This exercise, together with other reduced form evidence, allows us to highlight some similarities between the three episodes. Indeed, our estimates suggest that these economies have gone through a slow moving process in which a technological revolution creates a boom in productivity, followed by a vague of optimism about the long run. The end of the boom implied a slowdown of innovation, together with a slowdown of aggregate productivity growth. Because of imperfect information, beliefs were persistent and, therefore, the private sector remained optimistic for a sizeable period of time even after the slowdown of productivity. We analyze the implications of optimism in a model with explicit borrowing and lending. In the model, the degree of optimism observed in the data implies a large accumulation of debt. The debt burden coupled with the slowdown of productivity can drag the economy into a long recession lasting, according to our estimates, about 10 years.

Rodolfo Manuelli - Washington University of St. Louis

May 21, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Lifetime Labor Supply and Human Capital Accumulation

Special Lecture: Rajnish Mehra - Arizona State University

May 24, 2012
from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm

Topics in Asset Pricing

Alessandra Voena - Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University

May 24, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Prenuptial Agreements and Household Welfare: Evidence from Italy

Abstract:

This paper examines the welfare implications of a particular kind of prenuptial agreement, which allows Italian couples to costlessly choose at the time of marriage how they want their assets to be divided in case of divorce. Using unique administrative data on marriages and divorces from 1995 to 2009, it shows that both separation of property and community property are popular choices among Italian couples, and that the choice of regime is systematically correlated with the couples’ characteristics. These patterns of correlations are consistent with a model in which some couples decide to commit to a property division rule that will require splitting assets equally, as they anticipate that one spouse will be making substantial marriage-specific investments, while other couples choose to hold their assets in separation of property, as both spouses are able to maintain good economic outside options to the marriage. For the couples who choose separation of property, the welfare benefits of foregoing community property are sizable, and increasing in the wife’s permanent income.

Lunch Seminar: Luigi Paciello - EIEF

May 28, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Monetary Shocks with Observation and Menu Costs (with F. Alvarez and F. Lippi)

Abstract:

We compute the impulse response of output and prices to an aggregate monetary shock in a general equilibrium model where firms set prices subject to observation and menu costs. We study how the predictions about the aggregate effects of monetary shocks depend on the relative size of the information and adjustment frictions.
We find that empirically reasonable observations costs increase the impact and the persistence of the output response to monetary shocks with respect to models with menu cost only. However, we also find that the large power of monetary shocks typical of models with Calvo type exogenous adjustments cannot be rationalized with any empirically reasonable combination of menu and observation costs.

Thomas M. Mertens - NYU Stern

May 28, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Equilibrium Existence and Approximation for Incomplete Market Models with Substantial Heterogeneity

Lunch Seminar: Antonio Peyrache - University of Queensland

May 29, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

A State-Space Stochastic Frontier Panel Data Model

CONSOB - EIEF Seminar: Andrew Ellul - Indiana University

May 31, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 4:30 pm

Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading

Giovanni Calice - University of Southampton

May 31, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Liquidity Spillovers in Sovereign Bond and CDS Markets: An Analysis of The Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis

Benjamin Moll - Princeton University

June 4, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Experience Matters: Human Capital and Development Accounting

Cheti Nicoletti - University of York

June 7, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm

Two can live as cheaply as one…But three’s a crowd

Summer Lecture: Guillermo Ordonez - Yale University

June 11, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Traditional and Shadow Banking

Juan Pablo Nicolini - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

June 11, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Monetary Policy and the Quantity Theory of Money

Summer Lecture: Guillermo Ordonez - Yale University

June 12, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Traditional and Shadow Banking

Summer Lecture: Paola Giuliano - UCLA

June 14, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

(1) Cultural Origin of Gender Roles; (2) Family Ties and Economic Outcomes

Summer lecture: Mike Golosov - Princeton University

June 14, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm

Principles of Optimal Taxation

Summer Lecture: Nancy Qian - Yale University

June 14, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

Food Development, War and Famine

Marianne Bertrand - University of Chicago

June 14, 2012
from 4:30 pm to 6:00 pm

Trickle-Down Consumption

Abstract:

While incomes of the non-rich in the United States have only risen slowly over the last three decades, incomes in the upper part of the income distribution have risen sharply. Concurrently, the average savings rate has been in decline. We ask whether these two trends are related: does rising consumption among (increasingly richer) rich households induce the non-rich to consume more? We find evidence consistent with this, suggesting that up to a quarter of the decline in the savings rate over the last three decades could be attributed to trickle-down consumption. Additional tests argue against permanent income explanations and against upwardly-biased expectations of future income. Consistent with the trickle-down interpretation of our core finding, households exposed to more spending by the rich self-report more financial duress. Likewise, higher top income levels are predictive of more personal bankruptcy filings. Finally, looking to the political economy implications in both federal and state legislations, we find evidence that, holding ideology constant, legislators that represent areas where income inequality is higher are more likely to vote in favor of policies that increase credit availability or decrease the cost of credit.

Summer Lecture: Paola Giuliano - UCLA

June 15, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

(1) Cultural Origin of Gender Roles; (2) Family Ties and Economic Outcomes

Summer lecture: Mike Golosov - Princeton University

June 15, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm

Principles of Optimal Taxation

Summer Lecture: Nancy Qian - Yale University

June 15, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

Food Development, War and Famine

Rome Junior Conference on Macroeconomics

June 18, 2012
from 3:30 pm to 6:30 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

Rome Junior Conference on Macroeconomics

June 19, 2012
from 10:00 am to 5:00 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

Rome Junior Conference on Macroeconomics

June 20, 2012
from 11:45 am to 5:30 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

Summer Lecture: Guido Menzio - University of Pennsylvania

June 21, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm

Random and Directed Search Models of the Labor Market

Summer Lecture: Gur Huberman - Columbia University

June 21, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

(1) Regulatory Forbearance in the Financial Crisis and Accounting; (2) Runs, on Banks and Otherwise

Summer Lecture: Guido Menzio - University of Pennsylvania

June 22, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm

Random and Directed Search Models of the Labor Market

Summer Lecture: Gur Huberman - Columbia University

June 22, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

(1) Regulatory Forbearance in the Financial Crisis and Accounting; (2) Runs, on Banks and Otherwise

MOOD 2012: 12th Doctoral Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics

June 26, 2012
from 1:45 pm to 6:30 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

MOOD 2012: 12th Doctoral Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics

June 27, 2012
from 9:30 am to 6:00 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

MOOD 2012: 12th Doctoral Workshop in Economic Theory and Econometrics

June 28, 2012
from 9:30 am to 6:00 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

Summer Lecture: Massimo Morelli - Columbia University

July 2, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

(1) Natural Resources and Conflict; (2) Political Economy of Institutions

Summer Lecture: Marco Battaglini - Princeton University

July 2, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm

The Political Economy of the Public Debt

Summer Lecture: Ariel Burstein - UCLA

July 2, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

Facts and Models of International Relative Prices

Summer Lecture: Massimo Morelli - Columbia University

July 3, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

(1) Natural Resources and Conflict; (2) Political Economy of Institutions

Summer Lecture: Marco Battaglini - Princeton University

July 3, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm

The Political Economy of the Public Debt

Summer Lecture: Ariel Burstein - UCLA

July 3, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

Facts and Models of International Relative Prices

Summer Lecture: Vernon Henderson - Brown University

July 4, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

Transport and Urban Form

Summer Lecture: Vernon Henderson - Brown University

July 5, 2012
from 2:30 pm to 4:30 pm

Transport and Urban Form

Summer Lecture: Raquel Fernandez - New York University

July 6, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

Women’s Rights and Development

Summer Lecture: Georgy Egorov - Northwestern University

July 10, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

(1) Dynamics of Institutions; (2) Political Economy of Non-democracies

Summer Lecture: Hugo Hopenhayn - UCLA

July 10, 2012
from 11:30 am to 2:30 pm

Microstructure and Aggregate Productivity

Summer Lecture: Georgy Egorov - Northwestern University

July 11, 2012
from 9:00 am to 11:00 am

(1) Dynamics of Institutions; (2) Political Economy of Non-democracies

Summer Lecture: Hugo Hopenhayn - UCLA

July 11, 2012
from 11:30 am to 1:30 pm

Microstructure and Aggregate Productivity

CONSOB - EIEF Seminar: Patrick Bolton (Columbia University)

September 3, 2012
from 5:00 pm to 6:30 pm

Cream Skimming in Financial Markets (with Tano Santos and Jose Scheinkman)

Yeon-Koo Che - Columbia University

September 5, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Credit Derivatives and the Cost of Capital

Lunch Seminar: Jan Brueckner - University of California, Irvine

September 6, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Partial Fiscal Decentralization and Public-Sector Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Norway

Workshop on “New Developments in Econometrics and Time Series”

September 10, 2012
from 8:30 am to 6:10 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

Fernando Alvarez - University of Chicago

September 10, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

A Real Options Perspective on the Future of the Euro

Workshop on “New Developments in Econometrics and Time Series”

September 11, 2012
from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm

For further details, please see Scientific Events.

Lunch Seminar: Eli Berman - UC San Diego

September 12, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Do Fair Elections Enhance Government Legitimacy? Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan

Lunch Seminar: Efrem Castelnuovo - University of Padova

September 17, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Monetary Policy Neutrality? Sign Restrictions Go to Monte Carlo

Lubos Pastor - University of Chicago Booth School of Business

September 17, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Political Uncertainty and Risk Premia

Massimo Franchi - University of Rome “La Sapienza”

September 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

On ABCs (and Ds) of VAR Representations of DSGE Models

Lunch Seminar: Ed Nosal - Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

September 21, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Repo, Fire Sales and Bankruptcy Policy

Mark Huggett - Georgetown University

September 24, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

The Money Value of a Man

Francesco Ravazzolo - Norges Bank

September 27, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Measuring Sovereign Contagion in Europe

Fabrizio Perri - University of Minnesota

October 1, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

The Geography of the Great Recession

Abstract:
This paper documents, using county level data, some geographical features of the US business cycle over the past 30 years, with particular focus on the Great Recession. It shows that county level unemployment rates are spatially dispersed and spatially correlated, and documents how these characteristics evolve during recessions. It then shows that some of these features of county data can be generated by a model which includes simple channels of transmission of economic conditions from a county to its neighbours. The model suggests that these local channels are quantitatively important for the amplification/muting of aggregate shocks.

Cristian Bartolucci - Collegio Carlo Alberto

October 4, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Better Workers Move to Better Firms: A Simple Test to Identify Sorting

Dean Yang - University of Michigan

October 8, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Transnational Household Finance: A Field Experiment on the Cross-Border Impacts of Financial Education for Migrant Workers

Lunch Seminar: Eli Berman - UC San Diego

October 10, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Predation, Economic Activity and Violence: Evidence from the Philippines, Iraq and Afghanistan

Christian Bayer - University of Bonn

October 11, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Happiness and the Persistence of Income Shocks

Nezih Guner - ICREA-MOVE, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE

October 15, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Distortions, Endogenous Managerial Skills and Productivity Differences

Lunch Seminar: Livio Romano - European University Institute

October 17, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Family firms and the agency cost of debt: The role of soft information during a crisis

Lunch Seminar: Alberto Bisin - NYU

October 18, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Equilibrium Corporate Finance: Makowski meets Prescott and Townsend

Alon Eizenberg - The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

October 18, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Grab them Before they Go Generic: Habit Formation and the Emerging Middle Class

CONSOB - EIEF Seminar: Ailsa Röell - School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

October 19, 2012
from 11:00 am to 12:30 pm

Market Maker Pricing and Information about Prospective Order Flow

Hélène Rey - London Business School

October 22, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

The seminar will be based on the following two papers:

Exorbitant Privilege and Exorbitant Duty
The Financial Crisis and The Geography of Wealth Transfers

Harold Cole - University of Pennsylvania

October 24, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Analyzing the E ffects of Insuring Health Risks: On the Tradeoff between Short Run Insurance Benefi ts vs. Long Run Incentive Costs

Otto Toivanen - Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

October 25, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Anatomy of Cartel Contracts

Abstract:

We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 Finnish cartels. One third of these clauses relate to raising profits. The remaining clauses deal with the instability of the cartel arrangement either through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how they deal with instability. We find that industry- and cartel heterogeneity matters. The number of cartel members, the degree of product differentiation and industry- and macro-characteristics are all associated with contract choices.

Lunch Seminar: Daniele Massacci - University of Surrey & EIEF

October 26, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Testing for Threshold Homogeneity

Lunch Seminar: William Zame - UCLA

October 29, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Experiments On The Lucas Asset Pricing Model

David Levine - Washington University in St. Louis

October 29, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Conflict and the Evolution of Societies

Lunch Seminar: Lars Persson - Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm

October 31, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Acquisitions, Ownership Efficiency, and the Tax Shield of Debt

Abstract:
We show how the tax shield of debt can distort ownership efficiency in the market for corporate control. Firms with higher optimal leverage, but who are less efficient owners, can outbid more efficient owners of assets with lower optimal leverage. Policies to equalize the tax treatment of debt and equity (such as limits the tax shield of debt) can improve ownership efficiency and total welfare by weakening the connection between leverage and outcomes in acquisition contests. Alternatively, if the acquisition price is fully deductible, tax shields play no role because competitive bidding for assets generate sufficient non-debt deductions from the acquisition price alone to ensure bidders pay no taxes in equilibrium.

Dirk Niepelt - University of Bern

November 5, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Credibility for Sale

Jan Eeckhout - Universitat Pompeu Fabra

November 6, 2012
from 3:00 pm to 4:30 pm

Mismatch and Unemployment Risk

Abstract:

Risk aversion is a natural source of mismatch. We consider sorting of workers with different asset holdings into jobs of varying productivity. In order to smooth consumption, job searchers choose the optimal bundle of wages and unemployment risk. Workers with low asset holdings direct their job search to low productivity firms because they offer low wage, low risk jobs. We show that this occurs under a necessary and sufficient condition closely related to Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion. Assets and productivities are complementary, but the sorting outcome is inefficient. Under complete information, the planner would like to reduce income inequality as well as unemployment risk. We also analyze the optimal mechanism when asset holdings are private information.

Lunch Seminar: Patrick Hürtgen - University of Bonn

November 8, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Sovereign default risk and state-dependent twin deficits

Abstract:
This paper studies government default in a small open economy model and shows that the propagation of economic shocks results in a state-dependent correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account. The model features two assets - private and public debt - where non-linear risk premia on government bonds arise endogenously when public debt is close to its fiscal limit, i.e. the maximum capacity of a country to repay its debt. Households internalize that the possibility of government default implies an increase in the dispersion of resulting tax levels leading to precautionary savings at high debt levels. The model is in line with empirical evidence that shows a decrease in the correlation of the twin deficits the higher is public debt.

Tarun Ramadorai - Saïd Business School, University of Oxford

November 8, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Do Stock Traders Learn From Experience? Evidence from an Emerging Market

Abstract:
This paper reports evidence that individual investors in Indian equities hold better performing portfolios as they become more experienced in the equity market. Several standard measures of investment mistakes, including underdiversification, high turnover, and the disposition effect, also decline with account age. These mistakes become less prevalent when investors experience poor returns resulting from them, consistent with models of reinforcement learning.

Lunch Seminar: Matthias Doepke - Northwestern University

November 9, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

The Baby Boom and World War II: A Macroeconomic Analysis

Christopher Hennessy - London Business School

November 12, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Liquidity-Based Security Design: The Case of Uninformed Sellers

Lunch Seminar: Stephen Wright - Bìrkbeck University of London

November 13, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Non-Uniqueness of Deep Parameters and Shocks in Estimated DSGE Models: A Health Warning

Lunch Seminar: Nicola Persico - Kellogg School of Management

November 15, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing

Tobias Kretschmer - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

November 15, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Market leadership through technology – Backward compatibility in the U.S. Handheld Video Game Industry

Harald Uhlig - University of Chicago

November 19, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

The Dynamics of Sovereign Debt Crises and Bailouts

Valentina Corradi - University of Warwick

November 22, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Conditional Alphas and Realized Betas

Lunch Seminar: Alberto Bennardo - University of Salerno

November 23, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Perks as Second Best Optimal Compensations

Refet Gürkaynak - Bilkent University

November 26, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Judging the DSGE Model by Its Forecast

Abstract:

We study the forecasting ability of the standard estimated medium scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We show that although the model forecasts have lower root mean squared error compared to judgmental and statistical forecasts, the absolute forecasting ability is very poor. We argue that average forecasting ability during the Great Moderation is not a good metric to judge a model’s validity. We then offer alternative ways of using forecasts to judge the model. Importantly, we also highlight the importance of data and sample choices in the model’s forecasting ability. With the proper data treatment and choice of sample period when macroeconomic aggregates were indeed forecastable (pre-Great Moderation) the model provides a good forecasting performance.

Daniele Checchi (University of Milan)

November 29, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Educational Policies in a Long Run perspective

Nicola Pavoni - Bocconi University

December 3, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Efficient Child Care Subsidies (with Christine Ho, Singapore Management University)

Abstract:

We introduce household-provided child care in an optimal income taxation problem `a la Mirrlees. In our model, individuals have private information on effort cost and can devote part of their time to child care activities. We first characterize the constrained efficient allocation and propose an implementation that makes an efficiency case for child care subsidies on formal child care cost. Consistently with existing schemes, the optimal subsidies follow a sliding scale where higher child care subsidies are paid to lower income earners. We then calibrate our model to features of the US economy and focus on single mothers with children aged below 6. The optimal average subsidy rates are less generous than existing one, they range between 51% for low income earners decreasing to 5% for moderately low income earners and are nil for high and very high income earners.

Franc Klaassen - Universiteit van Amsterdam

December 10, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Identifying the weights in exchange market pressure

Francesco Bartolucci - University of Perugia

December 13, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Ranking Scientific Journals Via Latent Class Models for Polytomous Item Response Data

Martin Uribe - Columbia University

December 17, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Prudential Policy For Peggers

Lunch Seminar: Carlo Cottarelli - IMF

December 19, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

European Fiscal Union: A Vision for the Long Run

Roberto Robatto - University of Chicago

December 19, 2012
from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm

Open Market Operations and Money Supply at Zero Nominal Interest Rates

Lunch Seminar: Efraim Benmelech - Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

December 20, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Risky Lending?

Imran Rasul - University College London

December 20, 2012
from 5:30 pm to 7:00 pm

Leaders and Followers: A Case Study of Papal Influences on Fertility Preferences and Behavior (joint with Vittorio Bassi - UCL and IFS)

Lunch Seminar: Oriana Bandiera - London School of Economics

December 21, 2012
from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm

Can basic entrepreneurship transform the economic lives of the poor?

Abstract:
This paper provides causal evidence on whether transferring capital and skills enables the most disadvantaged within a society to alter their occupational choices and exit poverty. We conduct a randomized evaluation of a program that provides assets and training to the poorest women in rural Bangladesh. We find that the program transforms the occupational choices of the poor - treated women spend 92% more hours running their new businesses and 26% less hours in wage employment. This shift from insecure wage labor to self-employment is associated with a 38% increase in earnings. Women, who were largely assetless and illiterate agricultural laborers at baseline, begin to close the gap with middle class women on dimensions such as occupational choice, regularity of earnings, household per capita expenditure and happiness. Inculcating basic entrepreneurship, where the most disadvantaged women take on business activities which hitherto had been the preserve of non-poor women, is shown to be a powerful means of transforming the economic lives of the poor.