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UID:433d6b5fa3d2d0c1ae239fa5ca40481f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170426T194912
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Vladimir Asriyan - CREi-UPF, Barcelona GSE
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE: Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Adverse Selection  (with W
 illiam Fuchs and Brett Green)\n\n\n \nAbstract:\n How effectively does a de
 centralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout 
 the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting, in which sellers 
 have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate 
 state. We first characterize equilibria with an arbitrary (but finite) numb
 er of informed sellers. A common feature is that each seller’s trading beha
 vior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the
  aggregate state. We then ask whether the state is revealed as the number o
 f informed sellers goes to infinity. Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no
 . We provide conditions under which the amount of information revealed is n
 ecessarily bounded and does not reveal the aggregate state. When these cond
 itions are violated, there may be coexistence of equilibria that lead to fu
 ll revelation with those that do not. Finally, the theory has implications 
 for policies meant to enhance information dissemination in markets.\n
DTSTAMP:20260412T110243Z
DTSTART:20170523T130000Z
DTEND:20170523T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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