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UID:f597a7baa5940a832ccb2d533c892cb7
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20190612T112025
SUMMARY:Anmol Bhandari - University of Minnesota
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong>Capital Misallocation and Risk Sharing </strong>joint with Hengj
 ie Ai, Yuchen Chen, and Ying Chao</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstra
 ct:</p><p style="margin-top: 0cm; margin-right: 0cm; margin-bottom: 0.0001p
 t; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibr
 i','sans-serif';">This paper shows that factor misallocation is closely tie
 d to the risk-sharing avenues available to firm owners. In contrast to the 
 commonly studied bond-only economy with collateral constraints (for example
  Moll (2014), we find that the degree of misallocation is emph {increasing}
  in persistence of the idiosyncratic risk when firms have access to state-c
 ontingent contracts. The possibility to transfer wealth from high productiv
 ity states to low productivity states allows firm owners to trade off effic
 ient allocation of consumption against efficient allocation of capital. We 
 show that for reasonable values of risk aversion, insurance needs more than
  offset production efficiency concerns and thereby generates large capital 
 misallocation</span>.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260403T201633Z
DTSTART:20190614T163000Z
DTEND:20190614T173000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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