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UID:f597a7baa5940a832ccb2d533c892cb7
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20190612T112025
SUMMARY:Anmol Bhandari - University of Minnesota
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nCapital Misallocation and Risk Sharing joint with Hengjie Ai, Yuchen Ch
 en, and Ying Chao\nAbstract:\nThis paper shows that factor misallocation is
  closely tied to the risk-sharing avenues available to firm owners. In cont
 rast to the commonly studied bond-only economy with collateral constraints 
 (for example Moll (2014), we find that the degree of misallocation is emph 
 {increasing} in persistence of the idiosyncratic risk when firms have acces
 s to state-contingent contracts. The possibility to transfer wealth from hi
 gh productivity states to low productivity states allows firm owners to tra
 de off efficient allocation of consumption against efficient allocation of 
 capital. We show that for reasonable values of risk aversion, insurance nee
 ds more than offset production efficiency concerns and thereby generates la
 rge capital misallocation.\n
DTSTAMP:20260403T201202Z
DTSTART:20190614T163000Z
DTEND:20190614T173000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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