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UID:7bddc217f484f92b80f10d44d262ad3f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20260818T063942
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Carlo Medici - UCLA
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Political Appointments, Careers, and Performance in the Public Sector: Evid
 ence from U.S. Federal Judges\n\n\nAbstract:\nThis paper studies the dynami
 c effects of political appointments on the careers and performance of civil
  servants. We focus on U.S. federal judges, who are nominated by the Presid
 ent on the recommendation of their home-state senators. Leveraging a novel 
 individual-level dataset linking judges and senators over more than two cen
 turies (1789-2019), we employ difference-in-differences and event-study des
 igns to compare judges whose recommending senators have left office to thos
 e whose have not. Following a recommender's exit, judicial performance decl
 ines: judges author fewer and lower-quality opinions, accumulate a larger b
 acklog of civil cases, and see more of their decisions reversed on appeal. 
 The main channel is an erosion of career prospects: once their recommenders
  leave, district court judges become markedly less likely to be promoted to
  higher courts. These findings show that political appointments shape the p
 erformance of civil servants well beyond the selection stage, with conseque
 nces that persist and compound throughout their careers.\n
DTSTAMP:20260913T180458Z
DTSTART:20260916T130000Z
DTEND:20260916T140000Z
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