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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:887e9ea88a2e86e685a0d682c7ed032a
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20190508T124857
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Viktar Fedaseyeu - Università Bocconi
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-
 family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';">Why Do Corporate PACs Give so Little Money
  to Politicians?</span></strong><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 
 'Calibri','sans-serif';"> Joint with Lev Lvovskiy </span></p><p style="text
 -align: justify;"><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri','san
 s-serif';">Abstract:</span></p><p style="text-align: justify;"><span style=
 "font-size: 11pt; font-family: 'Calibri','sans-serif';">We use the logic of
  classical portfolio choice theory to rationalize seemingly contradicting p
 atterns of political contributions in the United States. In particular, lar
 ge firm-level benefits from political participation can be trivial for indi
 vidual shareholders holding a small fraction of the firm's equity. Since th
 e ultimate source of corporate political contributions are employees and sh
 areholders, portfolio theory can help explain why corporations contribute s
 o little relative to the large potential benefits that political contributi
 ons can provide. Furthermore, the portfolio choice approach helps us uncove
 r and document new facts about political contributions that would not be ap
 parent otherwise.</span></p>
DTSTAMP:20260405T051258Z
DTSTART:20190517T130000Z
DTEND:20190517T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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