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UID:887e9ea88a2e86e685a0d682c7ed032a
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20190508T124857
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Viktar Fedaseyeu - Università Bocconi
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Why Do Corporate PACs Give so Little Money to Politicians? Joint with Lev L
 vovskiy \nAbstract:\nWe use the logic of classical portfolio choice theory 
 to rationalize seemingly contradicting patterns of political contributions 
 in the United States. In particular, large firm-level benefits from politic
 al participation can be trivial for individual shareholders holding a small
  fraction of the firm's equity. Since the ultimate source of corporate poli
 tical contributions are employees and shareholders, portfolio theory can he
 lp explain why corporations contribute so little relative to the large pote
 ntial benefits that political contributions can provide. Furthermore, the p
 ortfolio choice approach helps us uncover and document new facts about poli
 tical contributions that would not be apparent otherwise.\n
DTSTAMP:20260405T051149Z
DTSTART:20190517T130000Z
DTEND:20190517T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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