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UID:3251af50451a2c384620110a693b803b
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150210T181346
SUMMARY:Fabrizio Zilibotti - University of Zurich
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa\nAbs
 tract:\nMany wars involve complicated webs of alliances and rivalries betwe
 en multiple actors. Examples include the recent civil wars in Somalia, Ugan
 da, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. We study from a theoretical and e
 mpirical perspective how the network of military alliances and rivalries af
 fects the overall conflict intensity, destruction and death toll. The theor
 etical analysis combines insights from network theory and from the politico
 -economic theory of conflict. We construct a non-cooperative model of tacti
 cal fighting featuring two novel externalities: each group’s strength is au
 gmented by the fighting effort of its allied, and weakened by the fighting 
 effort of its rivals. We achieve a closed form characterization of the Nash
  equilibrium of the fighting game, and of how the network structure affects
  individual and total fighting efforts. We then perform an empirical analys
 is using data for the Second Congo (DRC) War, a conflict involving many gro
 ups and a complex network of alliances and rivalries. We obtain structural 
 estimates of the fighting externalities, and use them to infer the extent t
 o which the removal of each group involved in the conflict would reduce the
  conflict intensity.\n
DTSTAMP:20260405T210944Z
DTSTART:20140526T173000Z
DTEND:20140526T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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