Unintended Consequences beyond the Becker-Coase theorem
Abstract:< /p>
The goal of this presentation is to inve stigate the consequences of policy intervention in matching markets, such a s the labor market, or the marriage market. For this purpose, we introduce an empirical framework for matching models with imperfectly transferable ut ility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework includes as spe cial cases the classical fully- and non-transferable utility models, as wel l as many other situations, including taxes on salaries, deadweight losses, and collective models. We characterize equilibria and conditions for ident ification in our framework. We provide comparative statics and we are able formulate a principle of adverse consequences which goes beyond the Becker- Coase theorem: under imperfect utility transfers, a policy intervention aim ing at enhancing the welfare of one side of the market may in fact result i n a net welfare loss to that side of the market. As an application, we esti mate the magnitude of intra-household transfer frictions using BHPS data an d simulate counterfactual policy experiments.
DTSTAMP:20260405T123203Z DTSTART:20140710T130000Z DTEND:20140710T140000Z SEQUENCE:0 TRANSP:OPAQUE END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR