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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:dee6fce7618b90a36636c9589b2f2874
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20150210T190557
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Alfred Galichon - Sciences Po Paris, MIT
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Unintended Consequences beyond the Becker-Coase theorem\nAbstract:\nThe goa
 l of this presentation is to investigate the consequences of policy interve
 ntion in matching markets, such as the labor market, or the marriage market
 . For this purpose, we introduce an empirical framework for matching models
  with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tast
 es. Our framework includes as special cases the classical fully- and non-tr
 ansferable utility models, as well as many other situations, including taxe
 s on salaries, deadweight losses, and collective models. We characterize eq
 uilibria and conditions for identification in our framework. We provide com
 parative statics and we are able formulate a principle of adverse consequen
 ces which goes beyond the Becker-Coase theorem: under imperfect utility tra
 nsfers, a policy intervention aiming at enhancing the welfare of one side o
 f the market may in fact result in a net welfare loss to that side of the m
 arket. As an application, we estimate the magnitude of intra-household tran
 sfer frictions using BHPS data and simulate counterfactual policy experimen
 ts.\n
DTSTAMP:20260405T122814Z
DTSTART:20140710T130000Z
DTEND:20140710T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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