BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:007eb9e6367db18bd806696341ee41b7
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170426T194825
SUMMARY:Philipp Kircher - The University of Edinburgh
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Occupational Choice and Learning during Job Search: The Role of an Employme
 nt Agency (joint with Kenneth Mirkin)\nAbstract:\n We investigate learning 
 about occupational fit during unemployment, and in particular the role of t
 he employment agency in improving market efficiency. The unemployed are het
 erogeneous in and imperfectly informed about their ability in each occupati
 on. In each occupation, better searching workers are more likely to be hire
 d. Hence, workers learn about their ability from job search outcomes. Conce
 ptually, this setting entails a bandit model of occupational choice embedde
 d in a frictional labor market equilibrium. We characterize the search beha
 vior that a planner would choose and compare it to equilibrium behavior. Am
 ong those with high beliefs in the more productive occupation, those who al
 so have high beliefs in the other occupation should search longer in the pr
 oductive occupation than they are themselves willing to. In turn, those hav
 ing low beliefs in the other occupation should begin searching there sooner
  than they would individually prefer. Similar results are discussed for all
  other types. Policies that incentivize workers to search over a broader se
 t of occupations exist in most OECD countries, and these results shed light
  on the types of workers that should be subjected to them and the ones that
  should not. Efficiency of learning during unemployment has not been yet ch
 aracterized in the random search literature, and this offers a new perspect
 ive on the role of government employment agencies. Similarly, the bandit li
 terature has not given much attention to equilibrium considerations that ar
 ise naturally due to search externalities. We prove these results by consid
 ering deviations from a symmetric equilibrium allocation in a continuous ti
 me model.\n
DTSTAMP:20260406T032331Z
DTSTART:20170522T173000Z
DTEND:20170522T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR