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UID:d97174eeffa00685cd906e7d89368fd3
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170426T193012
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Fabio Michelucci - CERGE-EI
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:How to Boost Revenues in First-Price Auctions? The Magic of Disclosing Only
  Winning Bids from Past Auctions (with P. Jehiel and P. Katuscak)\nAbstract
 :\n We present an experiment to evaluate revenue implications of two disclo
 sure policies available to a long-run auctioneer: disclosure of all bids fr
 om past auctions and disclosure of winning bids only. Using a first-price a
 uction with two bidders, we find that disclosing the winning bids leads to 
 higher bids and revenues in the long run. We propose to explain this findin
 g by allowing a share of bidders to be naive in that, when presented with h
 istorical winning bids, they mistakenly best-respond to that distribution, 
 failing to realize that winning bids are not representative of all bids. We
  also develop a method to estimate the fraction of naive bidders in a betwe
 en-subject design and to relate it to the degree of bidders’ risk aversion.
  Our findings challenge the predictive power of the Bayesian Nash equilibri
 um based on full bidder rationality, and they underline the selection of hi
 storical price information as a key market design choice.\n
DTSTAMP:20260422T073115Z
DTSTART:20170508T130000Z
DTEND:20170508T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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