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UID:132f27fffa9ba1b5e5d1bb07035f6bbc
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170426T195458
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Anton Tsoy - EIEF
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE: Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty  (w
 ith with Andrey Malenko)\nAbstract:\n We study optimal security design by a
 n informed issuer when the investor faces Knightian uncertainty about the d
 istribution of cash flows from the project and demands robustness: she eval
 uates each security by the worst-case rationalizable model. In equilibrium,
  the security offer affects the investor’s assessment of its value through 
 both the structure of payoffs from the security and signaling of the issuer
 ’s private information. When uncertainty is sufficiently high, standard equ
 ity arises as the unique equilibrium security. When uncertainty is sufficie
 ntly small, the equilibrium typically features risky debt. In the intermedi
 ate case, both risky debt and standard equity arise in equilibrium. When pr
 ivate information is about assets in place of the issuer rather than a new 
 project, standard equity is no longer issued in equilibrium, irrespective o
 f the level of uncertainty, and the equilibrium (usually) features risky de
 bt.\n
DTSTAMP:20260422T061036Z
DTSTART:20170614T010000Z
DTEND:20170614T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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