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UID:dd58d0d3dfe99580ed3d6c0d125decd1
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20220905T115836
SUMMARY:Michael McMahon - University of Oxford
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong>Policy&nbsp; Makers' Uncertainty" </strong>with&nbsp;Anna Ciesla
 k, Stephen Hansen, and Song Xiao</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstrac
 t:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Uncertainty is a ubiquitous concern e
 mphasized by policymakers. We study how uncertainty affects decision-making
  by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We distinguish between the no
 tion of the Fed-driven uncertainty that is induced by the policy choice and
  the classic notion of uncertainty that emanates from within the economy an
 d which the Fed takes as given. A simple theoretical framework illustrates 
 how the Fed-driven uncertainty introduces a wedge between the standard Tayl
 or-type rule and the optimal decision. Using internal Fed deliberations, we
  provide the first quantification of the types of uncertainty that the Fed 
 perceives and their effects on the policy stance. The FOMC members’ uncerta
 inty about inflation strongly predicts a more hawkish policy stance that is
  not explained either by the internal Fed’s forecasts or by the measures of
  public uncertainty. In contrast, policymakers' uncertainty about growth ha
 s no impact on policy decisions beyond these standard controls. Consistent 
 with a model of inflation scares, policymakers’ inflation uncertainty refle
 cts their constant worries about losing the nominal anchor. We argue that t
 he desire to maintain inflation credibility is an important driver of the F
 OMC's decisions and provide evidence from the FOMC transcripts consistent w
 ith this channel.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260913T052233Z
DTSTART:20221024T143000Z
DTEND:20221024T160000Z
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