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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:7bddc217f484f92b80f10d44d262ad3f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20260818T063942
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Carlo Medici - UCLA
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman
 ';">Political Appointments, Careers, and Performance in the Public Sector: 
 Evidence from U.S. Federal Judges</span></p><p>Abstract:</p><p class="MsoNo
 rmal" style="text-align: justify;"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: 'T
 imes New Roman';">This paper studies the dynamic effects of political appoi
 ntments on the careers and performance of civil servants. We focus on U.S. 
 federal judges, who are nominated by the President on the recommendation of
  their home-state senators. Leveraging a novel individual-level dataset lin
 king judges and senators over more than two centuries (1789-2019), we emplo
 y difference-in-differences and event-study designs to compare judges whose
  recommending senators have left office to those whose have not. Following 
 a recommender's exit, judicial performance declines: judges author fewer an
 d lower-quality opinions, accumulate a larger backlog of civil cases, and s
 ee more of their decisions reversed on appeal. The main channel is an erosi
 on of career prospects: once their recommenders leave, district court judge
 s become markedly less likely to be promoted to higher courts. These findin
 gs show that political appointments shape the performance of civil servants
  well beyond the selection stage, with consequences that persist and compou
 nd throughout their careers.</span></p>
DTSTAMP:20260913T194636Z
DTSTART:20260916T130000Z
DTEND:20260916T140000Z
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