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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:ceb28c3562aee66fb1e38a0874b56e64
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240205T115214
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Achim Wambach - University of Mannheim
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nConstraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns \n\n\nAbstract:
 \nMany markets enforce bans on monetary transfers driven by concerns that w
 ealthier people may have better access to resources. This study discusses t
 he appropriateness of banning transfers as a solution to address such inequ
 ality concerns. We examine an assignment problem involving agents with hete
 rogeneous wealth endowments and preferences with positive income effects. T
 o address the inequality concerns, we introduce discrimination-freeness as 
 a constraint. Discrimination-freeness requires that the allocation of objec
 ts is independent of individuals’ wealth endowments. We show that for signi
 ficant large wealth inequalities, money is needed for efficiency. However, 
 a market designer who must not use monetary transfers faces the same restri
 ctions for the allocation of resources as a designer who is bound by discri
 mination-freeness. For small wealth inequalities, the results are different
 . Depending on the structure of the preference space, efficiency either can
  either be reached without using transfers or the market designer can use m
 oney to trade off cardinalities without violating discrimination-freeness.\
 n
DTSTAMP:20260423T043458Z
DTSTART:20241023T130000Z
DTEND:20241023T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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