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UID:62ad17cec4f9214985ea629f7d174e96
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240529T131223
SUMMARY:Michèle Tertilt - University of Mannheim
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nThe Political Economy of Laws to "Protect'' Women"  Joint with Mat
 thias Doepke, Anne Hannusch and Hanno Foerster\n\n\nAbstract: \nDuring
  the first half of the 20th century, the many US states introduced laws tha
 t imposed restrictions on women's labor market opportunities. This so-calle
 d `protective legislation' included minimum wage laws for women, maximum ho
 urs laws, requirements to provide chairs for female employees, and restrict
 ions on working the night shift. Eventually, these laws were lifted in the 
 1960s and 1970s through a series of Acts and Supreme Court rulings, such as
  the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. I
 n this paper, we investigate the political economy of both the introduction
  and the repeal of these laws. Specifically, we investigate the hypothesis 
 that labor market competition from women was the main driver of political c
 hange. To do so, we first use a political economy model to spell out the me
 chanism. Second, we show that when calibrated to US data, the model explain
 s both the rise and fall of protective labor legislation remarkably well. T
 hird, we use new and comprehensive cross-state data to provide empirical ev
 idence for the mechanism and contrast these findings to alternative explana
 tions.\n
DTSTAMP:20260426T230623Z
DTSTART:20241107T163000Z
DTEND:20241107T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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