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UID:a1b141b6bf86b74c9cc9388c7add1f47
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240605T095133
SUMMARY:Ricardo Reis - London School of Economics
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><em><strong>The optimum quantity of banks’ money </strong></em></p><p>Ab
 stract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">What is the optimal supply and r
 emuneration of digital money by the central bank when access is intermediat
 ed by banks that are not perfectly competitive? In the data, the interest o
 n bank deposits is lower than both the interest rate the central bank pays 
 on banks’ deposits, and the short-term interest rate for private investment
 . This paper shows that this does not imply that money demand is not satiat
 ed nor that the quantity of money is inefficient. The paper shows that sati
 ation and efficiency may not be the same, and that different frictions that
  drive the interest rate spreads can imply one but not the other. In theory
 , a well-designed remuneration of reserves can achieve efficiency. In pract
 ice, we characterize some events of an optimal remuneration of reserves in 
 the US data.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260617T094903Z
DTSTART:20240912T130000Z
DTEND:20240912T143000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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