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UID:a1b141b6bf86b74c9cc9388c7add1f47
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240605T095133
SUMMARY:Ricardo Reis - London School of Economics
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nThe optimum quantity of banks’ money \n\n\nAbstract:\nWhat is the optim
 al supply and remuneration of digital money by the central bank when access
  is intermediated by banks that are not perfectly competitive? In the data,
  the interest on bank deposits is lower than both the interest rate the cen
 tral bank pays on banks’ deposits, and the short-term interest rate for pri
 vate investment. This paper shows that this does not imply that money deman
 d is not satiated nor that the quantity of money is inefficient. The paper 
 shows that satiation and efficiency may not be the same, and that different
  frictions that drive the interest rate spreads can imply one but not the o
 ther. In theory, a well-designed remuneration of reserves can achieve effic
 iency. In practice, we characterize some events of an optimal remuneration 
 of reserves in the US data.\n
DTSTAMP:20260617T094833Z
DTSTART:20240912T130000Z
DTEND:20240912T143000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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