BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:711c9d2b9a2b240e17e6266b820726ef
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20240723T071845
SUMMARY:Elena Pastorino - Stanford University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nTaxing the Rich? A Theory of Income and Wealth Inequality&nbs
 p;\n\n\nAbstract:\nRecently, it has been argued that a progressive wealth t
 ax may significantly benefit the distribution of welfare in society with mi
 nimal adverse effects on real economic activity. This paper evaluates the m
 erits of this view within a dynamic general equilibrium framework that micr
 ofounds empirically plausible income and wealth distributions as arising fr
 om a fundamental agency problem between managers and entrepreneurs, on the 
 one hand, and capital markets, on the other hand. In this framework, wealth
  taxes distort the effort that managers and entrepreneurs expend to create 
 firm value, which capital markets reward them for, by shifting their choice
  of projects towards less productive ventures. When wealth taxes are broad-
 based enough to affect not just individuals at the top of the wealth distri
 bution, who contribute the most to firms' productivity, they help reduce in
 equality but depress capital accumulation and output in the economy. The mo
 del accounts well for the degree of income and wealth inequality observed i
 n the United States, including the very different degrees of concentration 
 of the distributions of income and wealth at the top. The model also implie
 s a substantial output loss from wealth taxes of the magnitude currently be
 ing debated. The reduction in inequality that wealth taxes lead to would be
  achieved at a much lower cost by modestly increasing the progressivity of 
 income taxes rather than by introducing progressive wealth taxes.\n
DTSTAMP:20260416T010414Z
DTSTART:20250317T163000Z
DTEND:20250317T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR