BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:315a0045ba08d26b9b561c34addfb63c
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20250108T095634
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Dimitrios Xefteris - University of Cyprus
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><em><strong>Ballot Richness and Information Aggregation</strong></em></p
 ><p>Abstract:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">We study voting when commi
 ttee members have different information quality. In such environments, more
  complex rules can help voters better aggregate information by endogenously
  allocating more decision power to better informed members. Using laborator
 y experiments, we compare two polar examples of voting rules in terms of co
 mplexity: majority voting (MV) and continuous voting (CV). Our results show
  that CV outperforms MV on average, although the difference is smaller than
  predicted, and that CV has more support than MV in treatments where it is 
 expected to perform better. We also find that voters with intermediate info
 rmation overestimate the importance of their votes under CV.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p
 >
DTSTAMP:20260421T102203Z
DTSTART:20250509T130000Z
DTEND:20250509T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR