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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:315a0045ba08d26b9b561c34addfb63c
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20250108T095634
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Dimitrios Xefteris - University of Cyprus
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:\n\nBallot Richness and Information Aggregation\n\n\nAbstract:\nWe study vo
 ting when committee members have different information quality. In such env
 ironments, more complex rules can help voters better aggregate information 
 by endogenously allocating more decision power to better informed members. 
 Using laboratory experiments, we compare two polar examples of voting rules
  in terms of complexity: majority voting (MV) and continuous voting (CV). O
 ur results show that CV outperforms MV on average, although the difference 
 is smaller than predicted, and that CV has more support than MV in treatmen
 ts where it is expected to perform better. We also find that voters with in
 termediate information overestimate the importance of their votes under CV.
   \n
DTSTAMP:20260421T102016Z
DTSTART:20250509T130000Z
DTEND:20250509T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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