BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//jEvents 2.0 for Joomla//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:aeb2ec81e33651d5e8d09f72e0d4641f
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20260430T080020
SUMMARY:Gianluca Violante - Princeton University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p><strong><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', se
 rif;">Time-Consistent Public Policy and Inequality</span></strong></p><p><s
 trong style="font-size: 11.7px;"><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family:
  'Times New Roman', serif;">Abstract:</span></strong></p><p class="MsoNorma
 l" style="text-align: justify;">We study optimal public policy without comm
 itment in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets economy. We develop a tr
 actable Aiyagari-style model in which a benevolent government chooses publi
 c spending and distortionary taxes in Markov-perfect equilibrium, and deriv
 e a transparent Generalized Euler Equation that separates tax-base, direct 
 redistribution, and price-mediated redistribution effects.&nbsp;We then exa
 mine how fiscal policy responds to permanent changes in wealth inequality. 
 Using panel evidence for OECD countries, we find that increases in wealth i
 nequality are associated with lower government consumption, higher transfer
 s, and higher labor taxation. The model reproduces these responses under ti
 me-consistent policy, whereas Ramsey and constrained-efficient policies do 
 not.&nbsp;The results highlight how lack of commitment interacts with house
 hold heterogeneity to shape the size and composition of government.</p>
DTSTAMP:20261023T180131Z
DTSTART:20260921T163000Z
DTEND:20260921T180000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR