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UID:c9c9b9e4b0bf6e943435cfd726284cc2
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170410T171713
SUMMARY:Vasiliki Skreta - UCL
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Selling with Evidence (with Frederic Koessler)\nAbstract:\n Consider a priv
 ately informed seller who can propose any selling procedure to a single buy
 er. Both the seller’s reservation value (cost) and the buyer’s valuation ca
 n depend on the product characteristics and on the buyer’s taste (interdepe
 ndent values). Consumer taste is heterogeneous and product information is v
 oluntarily and costlessly certifiable by the seller. We characterize feasib
 le selling mechanisms under any certifiability structure. While the seller’
 s certification ability enlarges the set of feasibleselling procedures beca
 use it relaxes his incentive constraints, it also makes deviations more com
 pelling as a high-type seller can deviate and provide evidence of his quali
 ty. Our main result is the characterization of the entire set of equilibria
 : Equilibrium outcomes are ex-ante optimal for the seller and generically u
 nique. The classical information unravelling result does not occur even whe
 n all consumer types agree on the ranking of product quality. In general, p
 osted prices are sub-optimal and in contrast to the case where the seller c
 an only post prices, his ability to certify increases profits compared to t
 he case where his product information is public, both from the ex-ante and 
 the interim perspectives.\n
DTSTAMP:20260422T231225Z
DTSTART:20160509T173000Z
DTEND:20160509T190000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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