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UID:28a5337c88018a095583a764d885eead
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20170426T195344
SUMMARY:Lunch Seminar: Giuseppe Lopomo - Duke University
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:Budget Constrained Procurement (with Alexandre Belloni, Leslie M. Marx and 
 Roberto Steri)\nAbstract:\n We study optimal procurement mechanisms for a b
 uyer who wishes to purchase a homogeneous product up to a maximum demand am
 ount, has a fixed budget. We characterize optimal mechanisms for any number
  of suppliers when only the budget constraint is binding. When neither the 
 budget nor the demand constraints can be ignored, we characterize the optim
 al mechanism for the case of two suppliers under regularity assumptions on 
 the cost distribution. We also show that these optimal mechanisms have stra
 ightforward dynamic implementations.\n
DTSTAMP:20260422T023406Z
DTSTART:20170620T130000Z
DTEND:20170620T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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