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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:e84f0317d12fdf1b1a5fe8c2b87ed582
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20171102T183635
SUMMARY:Macro Lunch Seminar: Guillermo Ordoñez - University of Pennsylvania
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE:<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong> A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign De
 bt Auctions with Asymmetric Information </strong> (with Hal Cole and Dan Ne
 uhann)</p><p> </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Abstract: Sovereign bonds
  are highly divisible, usually of uncertain quality, and auctioned in large
  lots to a large number of investors. As no individual bidder can affect th
 e bond price, we develop a tractable Walrasian theory of Treasury auctions 
 in which investors are asymmetrically informed about the quality of the bon
 d. We characterize the price of the bond for different degrees of asymmetri
 c information, both under discriminatory-price (DP) and uniform-price (UP) 
 protocols. We endogenize information acquisition and show that DP protocols
  are likely to induce multiple equilibria, one of which features asymmetric
  information, while UP protocols are unlikely to sustain equilibria with as
 ymmetric information. This result has welfare implications: asymmetric info
 rmation negatively affects the level, dispersion and volatility of sovereig
 n bond prices, particularly in DP protocols.</p>
DTSTAMP:20260422T023647Z
DTSTART:20170630T130000Z
DTEND:20170630T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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