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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:e84f0317d12fdf1b1a5fe8c2b87ed582
CATEGORIES:Seminars
CREATED:20171102T183635
SUMMARY:Macro Lunch Seminar: Guillermo Ordoñez - University of Pennsylvania
DESCRIPTION;ENCODING=QUOTED-PRINTABLE: A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information 
  (with Hal Cole and Dan Neuhann)\n\n\n \nAbstract: Sovereign bonds are high
 ly divisible, usually of uncertain quality, and auctioned in large lots to 
 a large number of investors. As no individual bidder can affect the bond pr
 ice, we develop a tractable Walrasian theory of Treasury auctions in which 
 investors are asymmetrically informed about the quality of the bond. We cha
 racterize the price of the bond for different degrees of asymmetric informa
 tion, both under discriminatory-price (DP) and uniform-price (UP) protocols
 . We endogenize information acquisition and show that DP protocols are like
 ly to induce multiple equilibria, one of which features asymmetric informat
 ion, while UP protocols are unlikely to sustain equilibria with asymmetric 
 information. This result has welfare implications: asymmetric information n
 egatively affects the level, dispersion and volatility of sovereign bond pr
 ices, particularly in DP protocols.\n
DTSTAMP:20260422T023512Z
DTSTART:20170630T130000Z
DTEND:20170630T140000Z
SEQUENCE:0
TRANSP:OPAQUE
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